Daily Archives: September 21, 2010

Howdy from the EnergySec Summit

Well I managed to find my way to the EnergySec summit down here in Bronco Land.  What strikes me as interesting is the fact that years into this process (as in years since Urgent Action 1200 first came into being), we are still largely talking about the same issues, concepts and concerns.  In other words, a large amount of education and clarification still needs to happen in this space as people are still struggling to get their heads around the practical application of these controls.  Now I am not trying to suggest I have it all figured out or that there is a silver bullet out there, but I can’t help but feel that too many people are making this way more complicated than it needs to be.

In my book it is simple.  We have to protect critical infrastructure in order to allow it to do that which it is engineered to do.  That means protection from any and all potential sources of disruption.  If you look at regulations like NERC CIP or best practice standards like ISA99 or the NIST 800 series, you will notice that the end goal is a sustainable program.  Not a project, not a one-time hurdle to overcome and ride off into the sunset.  It is the establishment of a program to help provide the best possible chance of keeping your facility up and running!  And let’s stop couching protests in language about likelihood of terrorist attack.  Yes the threats are real, but the likelihood of someone on the inside inadvertently launching something is much greater.  (See today’s earlier blog on most likely threat vectors.)  If you don’t believe me, log in to hear what McAfee has to say about it via the NPRA on their “You can’t stop stupid” webcast.  Very fitting title!

Nonetheless the EnergySec summit is interesting and there are some very smart speakers up there.  Too bad it is a message that has been delivered many many times before.

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Safe and Reliable Versus Security Against Hackers

One of the most common things I find myself doing when I get to speak to owner/operators is trying to pitch my philosophy that security is not really JUST about protecting ourselves from the malicious, motivated hacker. Don’t get me wrong, they are out there and the ramifications are potentially significant. (Everyone remember the Aurora project?) And I do NOT want to undervalue the efforts of the many institutions and committees, government funding, research labs and others that pour significant effort into the tracking, monitoring and protection of our interests by defending us from cyber marauders. However, the almost singular focus on the image of foreign (and local) malignant peoples that are probing, snooping, scanning and hacking their way into our cyber systems means we often forget the overall objective of security. I will state it here as it is going to be a recurring theme for me. Our objective is to *protect* the safe, reliable and predictable operation of the critical infrastructure that weaves through all aspects of our lives.

Now securing our cyber space from hackers does have as its objective the safe and reliable operation of cyber systems and the facilities and services they govern. But the other half (or more) of the equation is the unintended or non-targeted cyber threats that exist in everyday electronic interaction. I am talking about the well-intentioned but sometimes less than empowered or enlightened scores of users in your existing systems. I can count on one hand the number of times my organization has been “hacked.” But I run out of fingers and toes if I try to count the number of times a colleague has opened an email, clicked on a link or brought in a USB drive that had a virus or worm on it. The impact to our operations was significant and no amount of perimeter scanning for hacking attempts would ever prevent it because the threat was invited in! Hand-delivered to the desktop and launched by a vetted, trusted and otherwise clever, productive employee.

The point is simply this: If you are trying to convince yourself, your budget or your employees that they have to install 2 or 3 factor authentication tools, intrusion detection services, create cyber security incident response teams, antivirus, backup, restoration, change management, account management (etc etc) tools and processes to protect a tiny little hydro dam that does more for water levels than it does for power production you are going to have a hard sell. If, however, you embrace the concept that best practice dictates due process and awareness supported by technology in the interest of being able to expect the expected, you might have an easier time getting everyone to pitch in. After all, you are only as secure as your least “secure” employee.

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